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ABSTRACT
In this article we study the effects of Election Day vote centers on voter turnout. Specifically we examine
Texas and Colorado’s experience with alternative arrangements for the number and location of Election
Day voting places and its impact on voter turnout in the 2006 and 2008 elections. We test our hypotheses
at both the aggregate (i.e., county) and individual levels. We find evidence that vote centers increase voter
turnout in presidential and midterm elections, and particularly among infrequent voters in midterms.
INTRODUCTION
How elections are conducted, where, when,and how voters are allowed to cast their ballots
on and before Election Day, has garnered increas-
ing attention from those studying election perfor-
mance, specifically turnout. Though the study of
election administration is not a new topic (Gosnell
1927; Merriam and Gosnell 1924; Asher 1982), it
has gained greater significance in explaining an
array of important behaviors and attitudes among
the electorate. Ansolabehere and Stewart (2005)
were among the first to detect the empirical impor-
tance of ‘‘institutions of electoral administration,
such as the administration of local polling places
(2005:386)’’ to explain the incidence of voter under-
counts, i.e., when voters fail to register a preference
for an office on the ballot. Stein et al. (2008) and oth-
ers (Stein and Vonnahme 2008; Brady and McNulty
2011; Gimpel and Schuknecht 2003; Haspel and
Knotts 2005; Dyck and Gimbel 2005; Alvarez and
Hall 2006; Atkeson and Saunders 2007; Hall, Mon-
son, and Patterson 2009) have demonstrated that the
location of voting places, the performance of poll
workers, and the type of balloting machines used
to vote all have significant and independent effects
on voter performance including turnout and affect
towards the voting experience. Affect towards the
voting experience may determine future voter partic-
ipation (Bendor, Diermeier, and Ting 2003; Fowler
2006) and mode of voting, e.g., voting in-person
on or before Election Day and absentee by mail.
In this article we study the effects of Election Day
vote centers (EDVC) on voter turnout. Election
Day vote centers are polling locations that are
open to all voters in a county rather than geograph-
ically restricted precincts. Specifically, we examine
Texas and Colorado’s experience with alternative
arrangements for EDVCs and their impact on voter
turnout in the 2006 and 2008 elections. We test
our hypotheses at both the aggregate (i.e., county)
and individual levels. We find that EDVCs increase
voter turnout, particularly among infrequent voters.
We build on previous research (Stein and Vonnahme
2008; Juenke and Shepherd 2008) by demonstrating
that vote centers continue to have a positive impact
on voter turnout, especially among habitual non-
voters. Moreover, we detect an emergent property
of vote centers: their positive effect on turnout is
greater in lower turnout elections and particularly
among traditionally non-voting populations.
Our article proceeds with a review of recent
research on electoral administration and voter
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turnout, a discussion of vote centers and their attri-
butes that might positively impact voter turnout, a
research design for testing our hypotheses, and
empirical findings. We conclude with a discussion
of the findings and directions for future research.
PREVIOUS RESEARCH
A host of scholars have examined the effects of
polling locations on electoral participation. One
recent area of research is the effect of distance
between a voter’s residence and their polling loca-
tion on voter turnout. The expectation is that the dis-
tance between a voter’s residence and polling place
is negatively related to their probability of voting
(Brady and McNulty 2011) and may be mediated
by factors such as access to transportation (Haspel
and Knotts 2005) and travel times (Gimpel and
Schuknecht 2003).
Factors related to the convenience of voting have
also been studied by researchers but, until recently,
the effects of convenience on the probability that an
individual will vote has not been theoretically well
understood. The problem with earlier theoretical
models of voter turnout is that they consistently
under-predict observed levels of voter turnout.
Recent refinements that incorporate a learning
process have been shown to better match observed
levels of voter turnout in U.S. elections (Bendor,
Diermeier, and Ting 2003; Fowler 2006). There is
some disagreement as to the specific learning mech-
anism that voters might use, but these recent models
all suggest that voters condition their future voting
behavior on their previous experiences. According
to these models, if an individual has a positive vot-
ing experience in one election, she is more likely to
vote in the following election (Fowler 2006; Gerber,
Green, and Shachar 2003). Some research also sug-
gests that negative experiences can lead individuals
to be less likely to vote in subsequent elections
(Fowler 2006). Simply stated, voting, like many
other behaviors, is habit forming if it is positively
reinforced.
Existing theoretical models of voter turnout pro-
vide a basis for linking the convenience of voting to
turnout. They also imply that even after the reform
is implemented, its full effect might not be immedi-
ately realized. The recency (i.e., post 2000) of sev-
eral electoral reforms (e.g., vote centers, improved
poll worker training, and new voting devices) does
not provide a source of data to examine long-term
effects of the reform, but it might be an important
topic for future research. Consequently, we might
observe a significant but not full turnout effect of
vote centers due to its recent adoption.
Several studies of convenience voting also sug-
gest that the effect varies by the type of election.
In particular, election reforms such as vote by
mail seem to have a greater impact on otherwise
lower turnout elections such as local elections
(Magleby 1987; Karp and Banducci 2000; Kousser
and Mullin 2007).
Election Day vote centers
Beginning in 2003, Larimer County, Colorado
replaced precinct-based polling places with Election
Day vote centers (Stein and Vonnahme 2008). By
2006, 19 Colorado counties had adopted vote centers
for Election Day balloting and several other states
had passed legislation allowing their counties to
adopt or pilot vote centers for the 2008 election.
What are Election Day vote centers? Most gener-
ally, they are an alternative means of administering
Election Day voting using non-precinct-based poll-
ing locations. Traditional precinct-based voting has
a large number of relatively small-sized voting pla-
ces located in residential areas where only certain
voters–those who live near the voting precinct–can
vote. With Election Day vote centers there are a
smaller number of larger–sized voting places, cen-
trally located to major population centers where
any voter can vote.
Election Day vote centers typically rely on coun-
tywide voter registration databases accessed elec-
tronically at each polling site. Voters in the voting
jurisdiction (usually a county) are provided ballots
appropriate to their voter registration address.
Election Day vote centers mark a different ap-
proach to administering Election Day voting. While
previous studies of voter turnout have focused on
the time it takes to vote as a main obstacle of voting,
voting is not necessarily the only thing that individuals
have to do on Election Day. In that way, there is an
opportunity cost to voting such that voting takes
time away from other activities such as work, lunch,
shopping, or recreation (Stein and Vonnahme 2008).
While voting can be thought of as competing with
other activities, voting can also bemademore compat-
ible so that all modes of voting will not be equally
costly. Focusing on the opportunity costs of voting
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suggests that there might be alternative ways of
administering elections that do not eliminate time
costs, but rather makes the act of voting more comple-
mentary with other demands on voters’ time.
As described in previous research, there are two
main characteristics of vote centers that allow us
to conceptually differentiate vote centers from
precinct-based models of election administration.
Those two characteristics are openness and central-
ization (Stein and Vonnahme 2008). Openness
refers to the property of vote centers that allow indi-
viduals to vote at any location throughout the
county rather than be assigned to a particular polling
location based on their residential address. Open-
ness might increase turnout by lowering transporta-
tion and information costs as voters can go to any
location that is most familiar and convenient for
them, particularly for individuals traveling outside
the home (e.g., commuting for work, school, shop-
ping, or recreation) on Election Day (Stein and Von-
nahme 2008).
The second characteristic of vote centers is cen-
tralization. Centralization refers to polling locations
that are fewer in number and located at larger
and more visible sites. Centralization also exists to
varying degrees in precinct based polling locations.
Centralization may have several positive effects on
voter participation (Stein and Vonnahme 2008).
Larger and more visible sites can reduce informa-
tional costs that voters incur when attempting to
find a polling location and offer more available
parking at the site. Centralization also allows for
better equipped polling locations to efficiently pro-
cess voters. With more staff at each polling location,
poll workers will be able to specialize in certain
tasks such as checking in voters or assisting them
with their ballots, which should lead to more effi-
cient operations and improved service to voters.
The explanation for why vote centers positively
influence voter participation focuses on how this
electoral innovation makes voting complementary
with other daily and routine activities, a condition
that has not been observed with other electoral
reforms (e.g., in-person early voting, relaxed voter
registration requirements/deadlines, and relaxed
mail-in voting). It may seem contradictory to expect
voter participation to increase when jurisdictions
reduce the number of polling places. A reduction
in the number of voting places, along with allowing
voters to vote at any location is also accompanied by
a significant change in the location, staffing, and
equipping of Election Day voting places. A smaller
number of larger voting places centrally located to
where voters, work, shop, and travel on Election
Day, with a larger number of poll workers, parking
places, and voting machines lessens the likelihood
that voting on a Tuesday will conflict with other
daily activities. The proper configuration and loca-
tion of EDVCs may even complement these nonvot-
ing activities (e.g., shopping at a supermarket with a
vote center). It is the size and location of EDVCs
that make these voting places more convenient to
voters and positively effect voter turnout.1
Stein and Vonnahme (2008) found that Election
Day vote centers in Larimer County, Colorado had
a positive and substantial effect on individual elec-
toral participation, although results from their sensi-
tivity analysis suggested that alternative explanations
could not be definitively ruled out. Additionally, the
relationship was greater for infrequent rather than
frequent voters. The subsequent spread of EDVCs
and use in more recent elections not only enables
us to further examine the empirical effects of
EDVCs but also permits an evaluation across coun-
ties, states, and types of elections.
Juenke and Shepherd’s (2008) county-level anal-
ysis of the turnout effects of vote centers fails to
detect a significant positive relationship between
the use of vote centers and voter turnout. Moreover,
the authors identify a negative, albeit weak and non-
robust, effect for vote centers on turnout in the 2006
mid-term congressional election. They conclude
‘‘the new thing in Election Day voting appears to
be a lot like every other procedure change before
it. It is different, unique, and convenient, but at
the end of the day it appears to do little to change
the size and makeup of the voting population
(2008:63).’’ The authors suggest that newness of
this electoral reform requires further analysis to
tease out the joint effects of mobilization and vote
centers in altering voting behavior and test for any
demographic changes to the voting population. To
this conclusion we add one additional caveat. The
length of time vote centers have been in operation,
especially among the 15 counties that adopted this
electoral reform for the first time in 2006, may
1The inadequate implementation of voter centers can produce
congestion at polling places and longer waiting times to vote,
both resulting in a strong deterrent to voting. Such was the
case in Collin County, Texas in 2010 (Collin County Observer
2011).
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have been inadequate for testing the efficacy of
this reform on voter turnout. The following section
analyzes data from counties in Colorado and
Texas from the 2006 and 2008 elections to assess
the effect on turnout, particularly among infrequent
voters.
DESCRIPTION OF EDVCS
We collected detailed information on EDVCs as
implemented in the 2008 election. While EDVC
counties share common characteristics as discussed
above, there are variations in the way the reform is
implemented. Polling locations must be suitably
located and equipped for the geographic and popu-
lation characteristics of the particular county. We
examined several aspects of how EDVCs are imple-
mented in different counties. Table 1 shows a break-
down of the number of registered voters, the number
of EDVCs, and the ratio of voters to EDVCs for
each of the counties with EDVCs in Colorado
for the 2008 election.
As shown in Table 1, there is considerable varia-
tion in the number of polling locations and the num-
ber of voters per place. There are several factors that
might account for this variation. First, the relevant
comparison might not be the number of active reg-
istered voters per EDVC. That is, some counties
have higher rates of early voting and permanent
absentee ballot voters which reduce the number of
in-person Election Day voters. While a county
might have a higher ratio of voters per polling
place, that does not necessarily mean that the loca-
tions are serving more voters on Election Day. A
second factor is the population density of the
county. A densely populated county might be able
to concentrate Election Day operations with a
smaller number of polling locations whereas a less
densely populated county might need additional
sites.
To assess the locations of vote centers we geo-
coded the polling locations in Colorado and
Lubbock, Texas counties. To examine distances
between EDVCs and voters’ residences we geo-
coded a random sample of 5,000 Election Day vot-
ers in Lubbock County and calculated Euclidean
distances to each polling location for each voter.
Similar data on geographic distances have been pre-
viously analyzed (e.g., Gimpel and Schuknecht
2003; Brady and McNulty 2011; Haspel and Knotts
2005) but these data are unique in that vote cen-
ters are not geographically designated. This has
two related consequences. First, any individual
can vote at any polling location so there is not one
distance, but rather k distances where k is the num-
ber of vote centers. Second, residential distance
might not be the most relevant quantity as individu-
als could vote closer to a workplace, travel route,
school, or other destination point. Using the geo-
graphic information, two quantities were obtained
for each individual: the minimum residential dis-
tance and the actual residential distance. The mini-
mum residential distance is the distance between a
person’s residence and the nearest vote center. The
actual residential distance is the distance between
a person’s residence and the polling place where
they actually voted. By comparing these two quan-
tities we can assess how far vote centers are from a
person’s residence, and whether they choose to vote
near their residence when given a choice to vote
elsewhere.
The results from this analysis show that 36.7%
of the sample voted at the polling location nearest
to their house, which leaves a substantial major-
ity that did not vote at the location with the mini-
mum residential distance. The median of the
actual residential distance was 1.25 miles while
the median of the minimum residential distance
was .495 miles. From these data, most individuals
appear to vote relatively close to their residence
although not necessarily at the location closest
to their residence. While this suggests that many
Table 1. Descriptive Characteristics of EDVCs
in Colorado in the 2008 Election
County EDVCs
Active Registered
Voters
Voters
per EDVC
Lake 2 3570 1785
Gilpin 4 3678 919
Conejos 8 4406 551
Moffat 4 6712 1678
Archuleta 3 7559 2520
Otero 10 9128 913
Park 8 10230 1279
Chaffee 5 10715 2143
Morgan 6 11619 1936
Teller 6 13748 2291
Summit 17 17138 1008
Broomfield 8 31606 3951
Mesa 24 76943 3206
Weld 30 117046 3902
Adams 40 177547 4439
Larimer 24 181864 7578
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individuals will vote somewhat farther away when
given a choice of where to vote, it should be pointed
out that precinct polling locations are not necessar-
ily the closest polling place for voters. If a precinct
is irregularly shaped, or if an individual lives near
the boundary, she could be closer to a different pre-
cinct location, which suggests that, for some voters,
the openness of EDVCs reduces residential dis-
tance.
EDVCS AND TURNOUT
In this section, we consider whether EDVCs
increased voter turnout in the 2006 and 2008 elec-
tions as suggested by research on previous elections.
The first source of data that we consider are election
returns from Colorado counties from the November
2008 election. A variable for the type of voting sys-
tem used in each county (EDVC or precinct) was
coded from information from the Colorado Secre-
tary of State’s office. The dependent variable in
these analyses is county turnout, which is measured
as the ratio of ballots cast to the number of active
registered voters. We use the ratio of registered vot-
ers as EDVCs are expected to make voting more
convenient, but do not directly affect the registration
process. Information on turnout and voter registra-
tion was obtained from the Secretary of State’s
Office.2
To analyze these data, we estimate a difference-
in-difference regression model (Angrist and Pischke
2008). The dependent variable in this analysis is
turnout in 2004 and 2008. The interaction between
the vote center variable and the 2008 dummy vari-
able shows the effect of vote centers on turnout.
We utilize this design to account for both election-
specific effects (e.g., turnout was slightly lower in
all counties in 2008) and county-specific effects
(e.g. certain counties might have persistently higher
or lower turnout). For example, counties with a larger
population likely have higher rates of mobility which
is related to lower voter turnout (Highton 2000). Of
particular concern is the possibility that counties
with higher turnout are more likely to adopt
EDVCs. The regression estimates shown in Table 2
suggest that EDVCs increase turnout (b= 0.024) but
the estimate is not significant at conventional levels
(p= 0.175). While the results are not statistically sig-
nificant, the samples for these analyses are also fairly
small (n= 126). Although vote centers were most
widely used in Colorado, Lubbock County in
Texas also used EDVCs in the November 2008 elec-
tions. Comparing turnout in Lubbock County to
statewide turnout suggests a similar effect as turnout
increased statewide by 1.8% over 2004, and by
4.7% in Lubbock County (difference of 2.9%).
Two limitations of these analyses are that they
do not account for individual factors that also
affect turnout and do not allow us to assess whether
the effect varies by individual characteristics such
as prior voting history. To account for characteristics
of individual voters we also analyzed the voter data
file from Colorado. The Colorado voter file provides
validated turnout data for all registered voters in the
state of Colorado. It also provides a measure of vot-
ers’ age, major party registration status, sex, and
prior voting history. Prior voting history includes
all general, primary, and local elections from 1996.
This information is used to create a count of the num-
ber of elections in which each person voted.
To control for these factors we match individuals
in EDVC counties to individuals that were in tradi-
tional precinct counties. This was done by first
selecting a random sample of 10,000 individuals
in EDVC counties and 60,000 potential controls in
Table 2. Difference-In-Difference Regression
Estimates
2004–2008 2002–2006
Year - 0.006 0.104
(0.504) (0.000)
[ - 0.010, 0.017] [0.078, 0.130]
EDVC County - 0.015 - 0.076
(0.236) (0.000)
[ - 0.036, 0.006] [ - 0.109, - 0.042]
Year·EDVC 0.024 0.044
(0.175) (0.127)
[ - 0.005, 0.054] [ - 0.004, 0.092]
Intercept 0.889 0.583
(0.000) (0.000)
[0.879, 0.899] [0.564, 0.601]
N 126 128
P-values from a two-tailed test are shown in parentheses. 90% confi-
dence intervals are shown in brackets.
2One potential concern with this analysis is that if EDVCs actu-
ally had a negative effect on turnout the reform could depress
the number of active registered voters and potentially increase
the turnout rate by shrinking the pool of registered voters.
This appears not to occur, as Larimer County, which has had
the longest experience with EDVCs, had a 16% increase in
active registered voters from 2004 to 2008 while the statewide
increase was 10%.
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precinct counties. Observations in EDVC counties
were exactly matched to a corresponding control
on the observed control variables (age, sex, major
party registration, and prior vote history). Of the
initial 10,000 observations, 9,776 were exactly
matched to a control, for a 97.8% match rate.
Since the observations are exactly matched on
the observable characteristics, the samples are bal-
anced on these variables.
Table 3 shows logit estimates of turnout from
the matched sample of 2008 Colorado voters.3
These results show that EDVCs have a positive
and significant effect on turnout, and that this
effect is fairly consistent for frequent and infre-
quent voters. To assess the substantive effect of
EDVCs, Figure 1 shows the effect of EDVCs on
the probability of voting. As shown in the figure,
the effect is positive and slightly higher for individ-
uals with a low to moderate amount of prior voting
experience.
We also analyzed a matched sample from Lub-
bock, Potter, and Randall counties in Texas.
Unfortunately, we were not able to match on sex
as this information is not included in the Randall
voter file. The prior vote history was also not as
extensive in Texas, as the information spanned gen-
eral, primary, and local elections from 2004. We
matched observations exactly on the remaining var-
iables (age, major party registration, and prior vote
history). Of the initial random sample of 10,000
Lubbock voters, we successfully matched 99.3%
to a corresponding control. As shown in the third
column in Table 3, the results from this analysis
are consistent with the findings from Colorado, as
EDVCs have a positive and significant effect on
turnout. As before, the coefficients cannot be inter-
preted as marginal effects so we calculated pre-
dicted probabilities shown in Figure 2. The results
in Figure 2 show that the effect is somewhat greater
for individuals with a low to moderate amount of
previous voting experience.
One notable difference between the two states is
that vote centers appear more efficacious in the
analysis of Texas counties than in Colorado. There
are several possible explanations for the difference
in the size of the effect. One is that turnout was
higher in Colorado so there is a ceiling to the effect
of any reform in presidential elections in Colorado.
Since there was relatively lower turnout and cam-
paign activity in Texas, there was a greater opportu-
nity for the reform to increase turnout. It is also
possible that the reform was implemented more
effectively in Texas, and there is the possibility
that unobserved differences (other than EDVCs
and the control variables) are influencing turnout
in the Colorado counties, Texas counties, or both.
Additionally, Lubbock has a large population of
Table 3. Logit Estimates of 2008 Turnout
CO TX
EDVC 0.109** 0.850***
(0.044) (0.045)
Age 0.001 - 0.003***
(0.001) (0.001)
Female 0.214***
(0.034)
Major party 0.322*** 0.591***
(0.035) (0.079)
Vote History 0.179*** 0.172***
(0.009) (0.011)
EDVC ·Vote History 0.003 0.050***
(0.013) (0.014)
Constant 0.067 0.064
(0.059) (0.049)
Observations 19,552 19,884
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
FIG. 1. Effect of EDVCs on the probability of voting (CO
2008).
3We also conducted placebo tests in which we regressed turnout
in 2004 on EDVCs. As anticipated, the placebo-vote centers
have a weaker effect on turnout than the actual vote centers.
In the case of Texas, the placebo-vote centers were associated
with a reduction in turnout. The Appendix provides a discussion
of the placebo test, model estimates, and limitations of the ana-
lyses.
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college students (Texas Tech University) that might
be especially responsive to EDVCs.
Additional analyses were conducted using data
from the 2006 midterm elections. As discussed
above, previous studies have found that election
reforms tend to have a greater effect in lower turn-
out elections. The methods of analysis for the
2006 data are the same as those reported above.
Data were collected for the November 2002
and November 2006 elections for each county
in Colorado from the Secretary of State’s office.
Turnout rates were calculated as the ratio of
ballots cast for the top of the ticket race (the gov-
ernor’s race had the highest turnout in 2002
and 2006) to the number of active registered vot-
ers. Next, we regressed the turnout rate on
the EDVC variable, the year variable (1 = 2006,
0 = 2002) and the interaction. The interaction rep-
resents the effect of EDVCs accounting for elec-
tion-specific and county-specific factors. The
results show that turnout went up in Colorado
from 2002 to 2006 and particularly for EDVC
counties (b = 0.044, p = 0.127). While the estimate
is not statistically significant at conventional lev-
els, the sample size is also relatively small. Look-
ing at Texas, turnout in Lubbock County remained
relatively unchanged. Turnout decreased by 3.7%
and by 4.4% in Lubbock for a net decrease of
0.7%.
An analysis of voter file data was also conducted.
For this analysis, control variables were created
for age, gender, party registration, and vote history.
Individuals in EDVC counties were then exactly
matched on these characteristics to corresponding
individuals in precinct counties. The matching was
conducted by first randomly selecting a pool of
10,000 treated observations and a pool of 60,000
potential controls. This provided a successful match
rate of 98.2%. Logit estimates are shown in Table
4. The model also includes a control variable for
Denver and Douglas counties. This was done to
account for the extraordinary circumstances of the
election, as these two counties experienced failures
of newly adopted pollbook software that caused vot-
ers at some polling locations to wait in line for hours
on Election Day.4 From this table, we can see that
EDVCs appear to increase turnout, particularly for
less frequent voters. Figure 3 shows the substantive
effect of EDVCs on turnout.
Our findings tentatively point to a positive turn-
out effect of vote centers. This finding, however,
varies by type of election. In lower turnout and pre-
sumably less salient elections (e.g., 2006 midterm
election), vote centers have a significant and pro-
nounced effect on voter turnout, particularly
among less frequent voters. In contrast, vote centers
have a similar effect on voter turnout for frequent
and infrequent voters in high turnout elections
FIG. 2. Effect of EDVCs on the probability of voting (TX
2008).
Table 4. Logit Estimates of 2006 Turnout
Coefficient
EDVC 0.209***
(0.048)
Age 0.012***
(0.001)
Female - 0.034
(0.034)
Major party 0.226***
(0.036)
Vote History 0.304***
(0.011)
EDVC·Vote History - 0.064***
(0.013)
Denver/Douglas - 0.374***
(0.049)
Constant - 1.839***
(0.061)
Observations 19554
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p < 0.1.
4See: Merrit, 2006.
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(e.g., 2008 presidential election). This result is sim-
ilar to the effect of absentee mail-in voting which
also varies by the type of election (Magleby 1987;
Karp and Banducci 2000; Kouser and Mullin
2007).5
CONCLUSION
The results from our research suggest that
EDVCs increase voter turnout, which is consistent
with previous research on early adopters of vote
centers (Stein and Vonnahme 2008). More impor-
tantly, we have shown that the positive effect vote
centers have on voter turnout is enduring and
extends to a wider set of counties and states than
those that first adopted this electoral reform in
2003. One unanticipated finding is the much stron-
ger and positive effect vote centers have on voter
turnout among non-habitual voters in low (i.e.,
2006) than higher turnout elections (i.e., 2008).
Though this is not an altogether unexpected finding,
it underscores the concern that other factors rival the
effects of electoral reforms like vote centers.
This finding might be expected. Lower turnout
midterm congressional elections do not generate
as much campaign activity as do high turnout pres-
idential elections. The positive effect vote centers
have on voter participation, in addition to the pub-
licity generated by local election officials, is more
likely to be muted in higher volume presidential
elections than in lower volume non-presidential
elections. Consequently, whatever effect vote cen-
ters have on the likelihood that infrequent voters
will vote might be muted by the significantly greater
volume and effect of a presidential election. Con-
versely, absent the mobilizing effect of a presiden-
tial election, the convenience of vote centers has a
less impeded effect on mobilizing infrequent voters
in quiescent elections. There is supporting evidence
for this assessment. Arceneaux and Nickerson
(2009) and Malhotra et al. (2011) report that efforts
to mobilize low propensity voters is significantly
greater in high rather than low turnout elections.
There remain several other important questions
about vote centers that require further investigation
and which inform our understanding about the
administration of elections. What are the costs of
voting and how might vote centers and other admin-
istrative reforms help contain these costs? Do vote
centers provide a more positive experience for the
voter, increasing the likelihood, ceteris paribus,
that a voter will vote in successive elections?
Elections are costly, and not just for the candi-
dates who contest for public office. With the adop-
tion of the Help America Vote Act in 2004
election officials are now required to comply with
a host of costly regulations and requirements includ-
ing new voting equipment, provisional voting, assis-
tance for other abled persons, and other minimum
administration standards. New voting machines
purchased in 2001 with federal funding have
reached or exceeded their reliable usefulness and
their replacement is not likely to be funded with
new federal moneys. Consequently, the savings
that might accrue from vote centers’ greater effi-
ciency may not be inconsequential.
Vote centers are expected to reduce the inconve-
nience of voting by making voting on Election Day
less rivalrous with other activities. Do vote centers
produce shorter wait times to vote, more qualified
poll workers to assist voters with voting equipment,
and voting places more central to where voters
work, shop, and travel? If voters, especially infre-
quent voters, have a more positive voting experience
at vote centers, does this lead to more frequent vot-
ing? These are questions that need to be pursued in
future research about vote centers and the adminis-
tration of elections in general.
FIG. 3. Effect of EDVCs on the probability of voting (CO
2006).
5Richey (2008) reports that turnout increased in Oregon’s all-
mail elections with higher turnout elections. All-mail elections
differ from absentee mail-in balloting in that ballots are sent to
all voters in Oregon. Voters in states with absentee mail-in vot-
ing must request a mail-in ballot.
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APPENDIX
Placebo test for Colorado and Texas
In this placebo test we evaluate whether Election
Day Vote Centers (EDVCs) are related to voter turnout
in 2004. This provides one means of formally assess-
ing whether an unobserved variable can fully account
for the relationship between vote centers and turnout
discussed in the main text of the article. To conduct
this analysis, we coded a variable for voter turnout
in 2004. In so doing we dropped Larimer County
from the analysis since they implemented vote centers
in 2004. This variable is subject to a non-trivial
amount of measurement error. Since the voter file
was obtained following the 2008 election ( January
2009), some individuals that were on the voter rolls
in 2004 will not be in the 2008 data. Additionally,
we dropped anyone that updated their registration
information after 2004 to eliminate the possibility
that a voter in the analysis might have moved from
one county to another (i.e., we only observe their
county of residence in 2008, which might not have
been their county of residence in 2004). This was,
unfortunately, not possible in Texas as the voter file
data did not include a registration date. The data
from the three Texas counties introduced additional
limitations as the vote history variable only went
back to 2004, so there was no data on prior turnout
that we could include in the placebo test.
The results of the placebo test are shown in Table
A1 for Colorado and Texas. First differences are
shown in Table A2 (there was no vote history variable
or interaction in the Texas data). These results show a
weak to negative association between placebo-vote
centers and turnout. The association in Texas is nega-
tive; in Colorado there is a positive association and the
substantive relationship is relatively weak. While the
analysis by no means obviates the concern about unob-
served variables, it does weaken the hypothetical
counter-claim that the results presented in the main
body of the article are attributable to an unobserved
factor.
Standard errors clustered by county
The following three tables show logit estimates
with standard errors clustered by county and different
subsets of the control variables.
Table A1. Logit Estimates
for Placebo-Vote Centers
CO TX
Placebo-EDVC 0.098*** - 0.050
(0.008)
Age - 0.002*** 0.037
(0.000)
Female 0.052***
(0.005)
Partisan 0.186*** 0.683
(0.005)
Habit 0.141***
(0.001)
Habit · Placebo 0.021***
(0.002)
Contant 1.450*** - 0.896
(0.009)
N = 1,811,932 211,864
Table A2. First Differences for Placebo-Vote Centers
Habit CO TX
0 0.007
1 0.009
2 0.010
3 0.012
4 0.013
All 0.012 - 0.010
Table A3. Models with Standard Errors Clustered
by County from the Texas 2008 Data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
EDVC 0.907 0.945 0.947 0.861 0.850
(0.897) (0.928) (0.936) (1.387) (1.388)
Age - 0.003 - 0.003
(0.004) (0.004)
Major Party 0.580 0.591
(0.788) (0.806)
Vote History 0.216 0.191 0.200 0.172
(0.151) (0.172) (0.230) (0.248)
EDVC·
Vote History
0.043 0.050
(0.230) (0.228)
Constant 0.396 - 0.111 0.023 - 0.077 0.064
(0.897) (1.210) (1.245) (1.387) (1.415)
Observations 19884 19884 19884 19884 19884
Counties 3 3 3 3 3
Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
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Table A4. Models with Standard Errors Clustered by County from the Colorado 2008 Data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
EDVC 0.104 0.115 0.116 0.108 0.109
(0.111) (0.105) (0.105) (0.086) (0.086)
Age 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
Female 0.214*** 0.214***
(0.028) (0.028)
Major Party 0.322*** 0.322***
(0.036) (0.036)
Vote History 0.191*** 0.181*** 0.189*** 0.179***
(0.014) (0.012) (0.023) (0.021)
EDVC ·Vote History 0.003 0.003
(0.027) (0.026)
Constant 1.020*** 0.371*** 0.064 0.375*** 0.067
(0.095) (0.078) (0.079) (0.071) (0.089)
Observations 19552 19552 19552 19552 19552
Counties 64 64 64 64 64
Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Table A5. Models with Standard Errors Clustered by County from the Colorado 2006 Data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EDVC - 0.074 - 0.105 - 0.106 0.065 0.063 0.209*
(0.117) (0.129) (0.125) (0.099) (0.100) (0.123)
Age 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Female - 0.031 - 0.031 - 0.034
(0.049) (0.049) (0.048)
Major Party 0.218*** 0.218*** 0.226***
(0.033) (0.034) (0.034)
Vote History 0.293*** 0.269*** 0.329*** 0.304*** 0.304***
(0.021) (0.019) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017)
EDVC ·Vote History - 0.065** - 0.064** - 0.064**
(0.030) (0.028) (0.028)
Denver/Douglas - 0.374**
(0.174)
Constant - 0.165** - 1.191*** - 1.758*** - 1.281*** - 1.845*** - 1.839***
(0.072) (0.073) (0.098) (0.071) (0.077) (0.082)
Observations 19554 19554 19554 19554 19554 19554
Counties 64 64 64 64 64 64
Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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